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# PRIVATE SECURITY AND ELECTION IN NIGERIA

The Report of **CSOs** Monitoring and  
Assessment of Private Security  
Services During 2023 Elections  
in Nigeria







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## Executive Summary

Election security is a defining factor of Nigeria's electoral process, as elections have continued to be characterized by brazen acts of violence with many security threats. Accordingly, the 2023 Presidential and National Assembly elections held on Saturday 25th February 2023 and the Governorship and State Houses of Assembly elections held Saturday 18th March 2023 witnessed many cases of violence and security threats. Moreover, maintaining physical security for elections is the primary responsibility of the federal government, and in this regard the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is empowered to take a lead in the deployment of security agents for election duty, and through the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) INEC in partnership with all government security agencies in Nigeria. Unfortunately, private security service providers in Nigeria are not part of or participate in the activities of the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) or their role and function in improving electoral security been recognized and appreciated by INEC and other key electoral policymakers and stakeholders in Nigeria.

In this regard, AFRILAW and its partners initiated the first ever Private Security and Elections in Nigeria Project with a goal of promoting election policy makers and stakeholders recognition, acceptance and support to private security participation and service delivery during elections in Nigeria, and also build a roadmap for effective private security governance and regulatory reform in the electoral process in line with international norms and good practices in Nigeria during and after the 2023 election. The Key Objectives of the Project include Convening political parties, policy makers, government stakeholders and CSOs to adopt resolutions for good private security governance during elections; Ensuring that private security companies' awareness and capacities to implement the resolutions are raised; Supporting CSOs monitoring of political parties, government and other stakeholders' use of private security during 2023 elections and private security compliance with the resolutions with private security; and Holding a debrief with government stakeholders, political parties and civil society organizations and private security companies to compile the findings linked to private security and 2023 elections, with a particular focus on the need for regulatory reform and on the relevance of international good practice. The Project Activities carried out under the project include National Stakeholders Fora on Private Security and 2023 Elections in Nigeria held in Abuja; Production and Dissemination of the Resolution on Good Private Security Governance during 2023 Election in Nigeria Pamphlets; CSOs Training Workshop on Private Security and 2023 Elections Monitoring held at Abuja; Engagement of 10 CSOs for Private Security and 2023 Elections Monitoring in 10 States of Nigeria; Production and Printing of Monitoring Report on Private Security and 2023 Elections in Nigeria; and Private Security Companies (PSC) Regional Sensitization Workshop on Private Security and 2023 Elections in Nigeria held in Lagos, Abuja, Rivers and Kano States.

In other to achieve the objective of supporting CSOs monitoring of political parties, government and other stakeholders' use of private security during 2023 elections and private security compliance with the resolutions with private security, AFRILAW engaged the services of 10 CSOs representatives in 10 States of Nigeria namely Federal Capital Territory, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Delta, Bauchi, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Rivers, and Enugu State. The CSOs carried out their monitoring and assessment activities between March 10 and 20, 2023.

The report covered key and important areas from Election Policymakers and stakeholders engaging and using private security services including working and interacting with them and Stakeholders and Private Security Guards providing election related services before, during and after 2023 general election in Nigeria. The areas covered in the data collection and reported for the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders and Private Security roles/functions during elections include Kind of election security threats and violence experienced or witnessed during the 2023 election; suspects and perpetrators of violent incidences and security threats during elections; Election Policymaker/Stakeholders engagement and use of private security guards and companies during elections; Kind of services private security guards and companies provide to the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders during elections; Level/quality of service or performance of the private security guards and companies; Experiences or witness any act of misconducts by private security guards and companies, and what kind of misconducts (*e.g. Intimidation, Harassment, Use of excessive force, Verbal Abuses, Assaults occasioning grievous bodily harm, Extortion, Stealing/Connivance, Unlawful Arrest/Detention, Torture,*

*Inhuman & degrading treatment and Gender-based Violence/discrimination*); Provision of training or preparations did the private security guards and companies received during the election (*e.g. Cooperation with the Public Security Agencies; Monitoring; Contingency and Risk Management Plan; Cooperation with Media; Liability Planning; Right to Vote of Private Security personnel, Safety and Health at Work, Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Use of Force, Detention of Persons and Incident Reporting and Remedies*); Provision/payment of allowance by the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders for services provided by the private security guards and companies during the elections; Level of cooperation between the private security guards and companies and public security agencies during elections; and Support official engagement and participation of the private security guards and companies during elections to complement the efforts of the public security agencies and improve election security in Nigeria.

Also, data collected from private security guards and the reports developed covered very important areas including Level and nature of engagement and provision of election related services; awareness and participation in a training session on the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During Election and other election security training; Level of risk, challenges and threats and violence suffered or experienced; Conditions of work in provision of election related services; Suspects and perpetrators of election violence and security threats; Level of compliance with available electoral regulations; and Level of cooperation and working relationship with public security agencies.

The area and state covered are limited and the data collected and responses are not exhaustive, and AFRILAW strongly believes that this report will form a bedrock and create a positive opportunity for future private security industry and election policymakers and stakeholders' engagement toward official recognition, acceptance and support to private security participation and service delivery during elections in Nigeria. Also, the report made good and relevant recommendations imperative toward building a roadmap for effective private security governance and regulatory reform in the electoral security in line with international norms and good practices in Nigeria. We hope that this report will help private security industry and election policymakers and stakeholders and the public to have relevant information and good understanding of the important roles and functions of private security companies during elections in Nigeria.



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## Background

Security is a significant and essential component of any electoral process, including from voter registration to the transmission of election results, and the security providers in election can have both positive and negative influence in any electoral process<sup>1</sup>. Election security broadly refers to the protection of all stakeholders, activities and processes, election facilities and materials, and information from harm and threat of harm in the election cycle<sup>2</sup>. Every country is unique and the dynamics of an election holds under varying political, security, social, and economic conditions. A secure electoral environment is crucial to ensuring the overall integrity of the process. Election security is in two-fold – first, maintaining a peaceful election environment, law and order, including bringing to justice anyone that attempts to disrupt the process. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure that security-related actions do not interfere with citizens' fundamental freedoms and legitimacy of the electoral process. The lessons from the Nigeria 2023 general elections have heightened the need for greater inter-agency collaboration not just from the public security but from private security companies to ensure adequate security and credible process in all the 176,846 polling units across the federation.

### Nigeria Political Environment from 1999 till Date

Nigeria's political climate is dynamic and complex, influenced by a variety of elements including historical legacies, cultural and religious diversity, economic difficulties, and geopolitical issues, but it also offers an opportunity for positive change and reform. The federal republic of Nigeria has 36 states and one Federal Capital Territory, (FCT). This system is designed to promote decentralization and devolution of power, but it also creates challenges such as revenue allocation, resource control, and intergovernmental relations. The political dispensation in Nigeria from 1999 till date has been marked by several significant events, including the transition to civilian rule in 1999. The country has witnessed the rise and fall of several political parties: including the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Nigeria has held several presidential elections since 1999, with notable ones being in 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019, and 2023. The 2015 election was particularly significant as it marked the first time that an opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari of the APC, defeated a sitting president, Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP. Nigeria's political dispensation from 1999 till date can be divided into five periods, each with its unique characteristics:

- The Fourth Republic (1999-2007) marked the return of civilian rule in Nigeria after several years of military dictatorship. Olusegun Obasanjo was elected as the President of Nigeria in 1999, and he served two terms until 2007.
- Late Yar'Adua and Jonathan era (2007-2015): Umaru Yar'Adua was elected as the President of Nigeria in 2007, but his tenure was cut short by his death in 2010. Goodluck Jonathan, who was then serving as the Vice President, assumed office and completed Yar'Adua's term. Jonathan was later elected as the President of Nigeria in 2011 and served one term until 2015. This period was characterized by the increased use of technology in the conduct of elections.
- Buhari's first term (2015-2019): Muhammadu Buhari was elected as the President of Nigeria in 2015, defeating the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan.
- Buhari's second term (2019-present): Buhari was re-elected as the President of Nigeria in 2019 and is currently serving his second term in office. His administration has been focused on improving security, diversifying the economy, and fighting corruption. However, Nigeria continues to face several challenges, including insecurity, poverty, and unemployment.
- The 2023 Elections (February 25, 2023): The 2023 general elections were keenly contested among the tri-party of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) presidential candidate and the current president-elect Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate and former vice president in the fourth republic under president Olusegun Obasanjo,

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<sup>1</sup> In the forward of the Guidelines for Public Security Providers in Elections Published by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 2017.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*

and the Labour Party presidential candidate and former governor of Anambra state, Peter Obi. The election was generally marred with widespread violence and threat of violence in most parts of the country.

Nigeria's political dispensation from 1999 till date has been characterized by a mix of successes and challenges, with each administration facing its unique set of issues. The country has implemented several electoral reforms over the years, aimed at improving the integrity and transparency of the electoral process. Some of the significant reforms include the introduction of the Permanent Voter Card (PVC), the use of card readers, and Bimodal Voters Accreditation System (BVAS) during elections. The country has made significant strides towards consolidating democracy, but there is still a lot of work to be done to address issues such as impunity, human rights violation, corruption, insurgency, and electoral violence.

### **Electoral Process and Security Threats in Nigeria**

The electoral process in Nigeria has been plagued by security threats over the years, which have had significant implications for the integrity and credibility of elections in the country. The process is governed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which is responsible for organizing and conducting elections at the federal, and state levels. The electoral process in Nigeria typically follows the following steps: voter registration, political party primaries, election campaigns, rallies and other public events, election day, vote counting, and announcing the results of the elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission.

Some of the key security threats to the electoral process in Nigeria include: political violence during campaigns, elections, and post-election periods. This violence is often linked to political rivalries, ethnic and religious tensions, and disputes over election results. There is also the threat of voter intimidation, vote buying, ballot box snatching and stuffing, and cyber threats such as hacking, and social media manipulation as emerging threats to the electoral process in Nigeria. To address these security threats, the Nigerian government has taken several measures to improve the security of the electoral process. These include the deployment of security personnel to polling units, the use of biometric voter registration and verification, and the establishment of special tribunals to handle electoral offenses. INEC has also strengthened its voter education programs to encourage greater participation and promote the integrity of the process. However, more needs to be done to address the underlying causes of these security threats, such as poverty, unemployment, and political polarization. In addition, the government needs to strengthen the capacity of security agencies, improving the integrity of the electoral process, and address the root causes of political violence and insecurity in the country.

### **2023 General Election and Election Security Challenges**

Nigeria has faced several election security challenges in the past. The 2023 general election held on the 25th of February 2023 also faced similar security challenges that have plagued previous elections. Some of the specific security challenges faced during the 2023 elections include:

- Political violence is a significant threat to the security of elections in Nigeria. During the 2019 elections, there were including ethno-religious threats, inter-party clashes, attacks on polling stations, and assassination attempts on candidates and party officials similar to what obtained in the 2019 elections, but there were no adequate measures were in to prevent such incidents from happening again in 2023.
- Vote buying was also prevalent despite the crunching financial policies and cash withdrawal limits introduced by the government during the elections, politicians offered money to induce voters in exchange for their votes to undermine the integrity of the electoral process and creates an uneven playing field.
- The presence of inadequate security personnel during elections leads to violence and intimidation, making it difficult for voters to exercise their rights to vote freely.
- The BVAS and IREV technology in the 2023 elections presented its own set of challenges, system malfunction, and the lack of technical expertise among election officials.
- One of the biggest challenges during Nigerian 2023 elections was voter intimidation and violence especially in Lagos, Rivers, Kano and virtually all parts of the country.

- Ballot box snatching and election rigging were also common challenges.
- Insecurity and terrorism including Boko Haram, Banditry, and Unknown-gunmen were also major challenges that affected the 2023 elections.

To address these challenges, the Nigerian government, electoral officials, and other stakeholders including private security need to work together to improve the electoral infrastructure, increase transparency, and ensure the safety of voters, election officials, and polling stations. They can also engage in voter education programs to regain voters' confidence and reduce voter apathy in future elections. Overall, the Nigerian government needs to take significant steps to address these challenges and ensure the integrity of the electoral process. This includes implementing stronger security measures, prosecuting those who engage in electoral violence and fraud, and increasing public awareness of the importance of free and fair elections.

### **Private Security Governance in Nigeria**

Private security governance in Nigeria is regulated by the Private Guard Companies (PGCs) Act of 1986, and the Private Guard Companies Regulations of 2018. The Act provides for the establishment, regulation, and control of PGCs, which are private companies licensed to provide security services to individuals, organizations, and government agencies. The PGCs Act mandates that PGCs obtain a license from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), which is the agency responsible for regulating private security in Nigeria<sup>3</sup>. The NSCDC is also responsible for monitoring the activities of PGCs to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act. The regulatory framework for private security companies in Nigeria includes the Private Guard Companies (PGCs) Act, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps Act. These laws set out the requirements for the registration and licensing of private security companies, the training and certification of security personnel, and the supervision and monitoring of their activities. PGCs in Nigeria provide a range of security services, including armed and unarmed guard services, escort services, security consulting, and investigation services. These services are provided to a diverse range of clients, including government agencies, multinational corporations, banks, and individuals.

Despite the regulatory framework in place, there are concerns about the quality of private security services in Nigeria. This is partly due to the proliferation of unregistered and unlicensed security companies operating in the country, which are often staffed by poorly trained personnel and operate without proper oversight or accountability. Additionally, there have been reports of human rights abuses and other misconduct by private security personnel in Nigeria, highlighting the need for stronger regulation and oversight of the industry. The private security sector in Nigeria has grown significantly in recent years, reflecting the increasing demand for security services in the country with attendant concerns about the quality of services provided by some PGCs, particularly with respect to the training and vetting of personnel, and the use of excessive force.

To address these concerns, the Nigerian government has taken steps to improve private security governance in the country, including the establishment of a regulatory framework for the sector, the introduction of licensing requirements for PGCs, and the strengthening of oversight and monitoring mechanisms. However, more needs to be done to ensure that private security services in Nigeria meet international standards and respect human rights.

### **Private Security Services During Elections in Nigeria**

Private security services play a crucial role in providing security during elections in Nigeria, as they complement the efforts of the police and other security agencies in maintaining law and order and ensuring the safety of voters, candidates, and election officials<sup>4</sup>. During elections, private security companies are often contracted by political parties, candidates, and other stakeholders to provide security for their campaigns and polling agents. Private security companies in Nigeria provide a range of election security services, including crowd control, access control, perimeter security, and surveillance. They also provide armed and unarmed guards to protect

<sup>3</sup> <https://nscdc.gov.ng/nscdc-act/>

<sup>44</sup> The Resolution on Private Security Governance During the 2023 Election in Nigeria.



polling stations, election officials, and ballot materials. While the armed guard role may be controversial in principle, in practice non state security providers including Nigeria Vigilante are often armed.

In addition to providing security services, private security companies in Nigeria also offer election monitoring and observation services. They work in collaboration with election observers and monitors to ensure that the electoral process is free, fair, and transparent. However, there have been concerns about the role of private security services during elections in Nigeria. Some stakeholders have raised concerns about the impartiality and professionalism of private security personnel and there have been reports of private security personnel engaging in electoral malpractices, including voter intimidation and ballot box snatching. There have also been reports of private security personnel being involved in election-related violence. Over the years, allegations of conspiracy and complicity in electoral fraud have also been levelled against the public security agencies<sup>5</sup>.

To address these concerns, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has established guidelines and regulations for security services during elections, mostly public security agencies with no explicit reference to private security. Undoubtedly, private security companies function throughout the election cycle. It is important that the security guidelines during elections recognize private security companies as registered and licensed by the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and make it mandatory that their personnel be properly trained and certified. Most importantly election security guidelines should set out the roles and responsibilities of private security companies during elections, and specify the conditions under which they can be deployed to ensure that their activities are in compliance with election laws and regulations. It is important to note that election-related violence is a serious issue in Nigeria, and in the past, it has resulted in loss of lives, injuries, and destruction of property. It is crucial for all stakeholders, including the government, security agencies, political parties, candidates, and voters, and the private security to work together to ensure a peaceful and credible election process. This can be achieved through dialogue, effective communication, and respect for the rule of law.

## Objective

The aim and objective of the civil society organisations monitoring and assessment of private security services during the 2023 elections (CMAP) is to monitor and assess private security services and election policymakers and stakeholders' use of private security before, during and after the 2023 elections including private security compliance with the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 Election in Nigeria.

CMAP is part of the Private Security and Elections in Nigeria Project been implemented by African Law Foundation (AFRILAW), Abuja in collaboration with the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and Association of Licensed Private Security Practitioners of Nigeria (ALPSPN) in partnership with the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), Switzerland and International Code of Conduct Association (ICOCA), Switzerland with funding support from the UK FCDO.

## Methodology

AFRILAW deployed observers to carry out CSOs monitoring and assessment of private security services in the presidential, national assembly, gubernatorial, and state house of assembly elections in the 2023 elections. The observers were selected from partner civil society organizations in 10 states of the federation, including the Federal Capital Territory, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Delta, Bauchi, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Rivers, and Enugu. A stakeholder interview guide and a private guard questionnaire were the main observation tools. The instrument elicited responses on a wide range of issues, including PSC compliance with election regulations, stakeholder experiences of security threat, and violence during the 2023 election. Basic demographic data was gathered, including state of residence and organizational affiliation. AFRILAW adhered to best national and international practices on obtaining participants' consent and data protection as well as anonymity of respondents.

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<sup>55</sup> <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2023/03/26/2023-elections-and-many-blunders-of-police/>

A total of 455 samples were drawn for the CMAP including 193 election policy makers and stakeholders and 262 private security guards companies. Participants comprised 104 (23%) females and 351 (77%) males. A mix of method was used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data from the field. The quantitative data was entered in SPSS spreadsheet software for coding and processing. The entered data was later converted to excel for further cleaning, which allows for spot checks of entries, filtering of variable etc., while ensuring that the data is ready for analysis and preparation of charts thereafter while the qualitative, and secondary data from desk review was analyzed using content and thematic analysis. The findings were validated through triangulation.

## SECTION 1: ELECTION POLICYMAKERS, STAKEHOLDERS AND PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES IN THE 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS

In other to monitor and assess private security services and election policymakers and stakeholders' use of private security before, during and after the 2023 elections including private security compliance with the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 Election in Nigeria, selected private security guards and key election policymakers and stakeholders were interviewed by the CSOs across the target states 10 states namely Abuja/FCT, Anambra, Akwa-Ibom State, Lagos, Bauchi, Rivers, Kano and Kaduna States.

### 1.1.0 The Election Policymaker and Stakeholders Using and Engaging Private Security Services

Election stakeholder comprise a broad range of individual and groups with a vested interest in election decision making and activities. The range of election policy makers and stakeholders interviewed in the CMAP include voters, candidates, INEC officials, party supporters and agents, observers and monitors, media, public security providers including NSCDC, police, DSS, and Immigration. Others group of stakeholders interviewed include medical personnel, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, private security organization, and the Nigerian Bar Association. Voters, party members, INEC staff, public security agents, and CSOs constitute the top five among 22 stakeholder groups interviewed in the CMAP. See Table 1

**Table 1: Election policymakers and stakeholders interviewed**

Stakeholders	N	% of Total N	Stakeholders' Distribution by State of Resident										
			Akwa Ibom	Anambra	Bauchi	Delta	Enugu	FCT	Kaduna	Kano	Lagos	Rivers	
APSGC	1	0.5%			1	1							
Candidate	6	3.1%	1		2					2	1		
CSO	11	5.7%		1	3					2	1		4
DSS	1	0.5%											1
Election Monitor	1	0.5%								1			
Immigration Officer	1	0.5%											1
INEC Staff	28	14.5%	4	1	2		5				1	13	2
KANSIEC	1	0.5%									1		
Media	5	2.6%			2						2		1
Medical Personnel	1	0.5%											1
NBA	1	0.5%			1								
NSCDC	8	4.1%			1					1		3	3
NURTW	1	0.5%			1								
Observer	4	2.1%							1	2	1		
Party Member	38	19.7%		9	3		4	9		6	2	2	3
Police	4	2.1%								1		1	2
Private Detective organizations (BSPDO)	1	0.5%			1								
Public security	16	8.3%	15										1
Religious leader	2	1.0%			2								
Security	3	1.6%										3	
Veteran	1	0.5%										1	
Voter	58	30.1%		9	1	19	11	10	5	1			1
<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>

### 1.1.1 Gender of the Election Policymaker and Stakeholders


Gender assessment is a crucial means of understanding stakeholder’s perspective of private security services in the electoral process. 455 sample was drawn for the CMAP including 193 election policy makers and stakeholders comprised 73 (38%) females and 119 (62%) from 10 states of the federation were interviewed in the CSOs monitoring and assessment of private security services during the 2023 General elections in Nigeria.

**Table 2: Gender disaggregation of stakeholders by state of resident**

State of Resident	Gender						
	Female		Male		Missing	Total	
	N	% of Total N	N	% of Total N		N	% of Total N
Akwa Ibom	8	4.1%	12	6.2%		20	10.4%
Anambra	7	3.6%	13	6.7%		20	10.4%
Bauchi	8	4.1%	12	6.2%		20	10.4%
Delta	8	4.1%	12	6.2%		20	10.4%
Enugu	13	6.7%	6	3.1%	1 (0.5%)	20	10.4%
FCT	6	3.1%	14	7.3%		20	10.4%
Kaduna	4	2.1%	16	8.3%		20	10.4%
Kano	5	2.6%	5	2.6%		10	5.2%
Lagos	7	3.6%	16	8.3%		23	11.9%
Rivers	7	3.6%	13	6.7%		20	10.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>37.8%</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>61.7%</b>		<b>193</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

### 1.1.2 Election Policymaker and Stakeholders State of Residence

**Figure 1: Stakeholders state of residence**



The election stakeholders interviewed in the CMAP are resident in 10 states of Anambra, Akwa-Ibom, Delta, Rivers, Enugu, Bauchi, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna and the FCT.



### 1.1.3 Election Policymaker and Stakeholders Roles and Functions

The electoral process has diverse stakeholders such as voters, candidates, election management bodies (EMBs), and security that performs several functions including registering and casting ballots, campaigning for support from voters, coverage, promote conditions that support credible elections, and providing security for voters, EMB staff, material and polling stations. Interviewed stakeholders identified a wide range of roles and functions performed during the 2023 General elections to include security, voting, monitoring and observing among others. It is important to mention that stakeholders failed to mention their roles before and after the elections.

Figure 2: Stakeholders role and function during elections

<p><b>1. APSGC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•oversee and voter, monitoring of ALPSPN members to make sure they comport themselves in an orderly manner</li> </ul>	<p><b>2. Candidate</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•voting and observing, monitoring</li> </ul>	<p><b>3. CSO</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•monitoring polling units, observer, voter education, voting and observing</li> </ul>			
<p><b>4. NSCDC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•security and monitoring polling units, polling unit inspection,supervise INEC and polling unit,supervise INEC collation centre</li> </ul>	<p><b>5. Immigration Officer</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•security and monitoring polling units</li> </ul>		<p><b>6. INEC Staff</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•conduct election at INEC polling units, coordination, inspection of polling unit,monitoring and supervision,observe, presiding, provision of security.</li> </ul>		
<p><b>7.KANSIEC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•monitoring and supervision</li> </ul>	<p><b>8. Media</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•observer, reporter, voting and observing</li> </ul>	<p><b>9. Medical Personnel</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•medical support during elections</li> </ul>	<p><b>10. Police</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•providing security and monitoring the process, securitring and monitoring polling units, supervise INEC and polling unit</li> </ul>	<p><b>11. Election Monitor</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Monitoring</li> </ul>	
<p><b>12. NURTW</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•transportation of election materials</li> </ul>	<p><b>13. Observer</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•observing</li> </ul>	<p><b>14. Party Member</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•defend party votes, observing, party agent, supervision, support to the party, voting and observing</li> </ul>		<p><b>15. NBA</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•observing</li> </ul>	
<p><b>17. Public security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•providing security, complement other security agencies, monitoring and observing, security and ensuring peaceful conduct.</li> </ul>		<p><b>18. Religious leader</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•voting and observing</li> </ul>	<p><b>19. Veteran</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•supervise INEC and polling unit</li> </ul>		<p><b>20. Voter</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•voting and observing, community mobiliser, promote peace, securing and monitoring polling units</li> </ul>
<p><b>16. Private Detective org. (PCDDO)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• intelligent gathering and over affairs of members of private detective organisation</li> </ul>					


### 1.1.4 Election Security Threats and Violence Stakeholders Experienced or Witnessed During the 2023 Election.

The Nigeria Electoral Act 2022 explicitly states what constitute electoral offences that relates to security risk and violence such as threatening, bribery and conspiracy or acts of violence. Stakeholders from the 10 CMAP states shared experiences of election security threat and violence they witnessed during the 2023 General elections. Most of the threats identified are classified offences in the Electoral Act<sup>6</sup>. Stakeholders experience can be broadly classified as; bribery and conspiracy; knowingly attempting to vote where the voters name is not

<sup>6</sup> Section 121- 128 (d) of the Nigeria Electoral Act 2022 states offences during elections and punishment.

on the register of voters; disorderly conduct include inciting others to act in a disorderly manner, destruction of election materials or any election device. Others are undue influence including vote buying, and threatening including use of force and violence, abduction, duress, and preventing the free use of the vote or refraining from voting. Most of these offences are punishable on conviction to fines, imprisonment or both in some cases, but the extent to which offenders are brought to justice remains unclear.


Figure 3: Stakeholders experience of security threat and violence



### 1.2.0 Private Security Guards Providing Election Related Services


In other to identified the roles and functions of private security service providers in the electoral process and in improving election security in Nigeria, about 262 private security providers from 10 states including the FCT comprised 231 (88%) males and 31(12%) females were interviewed in the CSOs monitoring and assessment of private security services during the 2023 General elections in Nigeria. See figure 4 and 5.

**Figure 4: Percentage of private security interviewed disaggregated by state**



Anambra state closely followed by the FCT and Delta were the top three states with the highest number of private security guards that provided election related services in the 2023 elections. On the other hand, Bauchi, Kano and Enugu states were recorded the least number of PSG that provided election related services.

**Figure 5: Gender of private security guard respondents**



More male private guards were interviewed in the CSOs monitoring and assessment of private security services during the 2023 General elections in Nigeria when compared to females. Out of the 262 private guards interviewed 88% were males and 12% females.

Over 30 private security guard companies from the 10 states of the CMAP assessment were involved in providing election related services. The list of PSC is provided below:

Figure 6: Private security companies that provide election related services


**Private Security companies that provide election related services in the States**

<b>Akwa Ibom</b>	Tower Of Ivory Security, Ediene Abak
<b>Anambra</b>	Alhasar Security Services Darforp Security Grayling Security Service King's Squad Ltd Ornabala Guards
<b>Bauchi</b>	Bauchi Peace Security Bully Guard Nigeria Ltd Danga Security Patrol Garu Security Hunters Ltd Kings Guard Nig Ltd Kombat Security Ltd Nigeria Vigilante Group Watch Dog PDO Ltd CITISERVE
<b>Delta</b>	Dynamic Cherish Security Company
<b>Enugu</b>	N24 Security services ltd Amoben Security Services LTD
<b>Rivers</b>	Aston Marine and Offshore Nig. Strike view Security Ltd Threat Security and Safety Ltd Thunder Bolt Security
<b>FCT</b>	Aims Security BMO Security and Guards Ltd Castle and Tower Guards Composite Private Security Company  Diplomatic Security Service Festamos Security Halogen Security Company Infinity Security MOSS Security Sears Security Ltd Specta Guards

According to election stakeholders interviewed from the 10 states, more private security services were involved in elections recently in Bauchi state and the FCT. Lagos, Kano and Kaduna did not record any involvement. See Figure 7 below.

Figure 7: Private security involved in election services recently disaggregated by state

**Involved in election services recently by state**




**1.2.1. Private Security 2023 Election Related Services**

According to data collected, private security providers played critical roles in securing politicians (15%), political campaigns (33%), supporting operations of public security (15%), and providing security support to INEC (3%). 34% of PSG did not render any election service during the 2023 elections.




**Figure 8: Services rendered by private security**



According to election stakeholders interviewed private security performed more gatekeeping services (56%), traffic control (26%), body guard and escort services (13%) and security in political rallies and campaign (5%).


**Figure 9: Services performed by private security according to stakeholders**




**1.2.2. Security threat and violence experiences of Private security providers during the elections**

Private security providers also experienced security threat and violence during the elections. For instance, 24% experience gender-based violence in form of harassment and insult because of their gender but there was no need for arrest in 85% of incidence against PSC. Often (62%), PSC report the case to public security agencies.

**Figure 10: Private guards harassed because of gender**




**Figure 11: Arrest and detention by private security**



Private security made arrest and detention only in limited cases (15%) while discharging their duties. Most private guards (85%) said there was no need to arrest or detain anyone while discharging their duties.

However, 4% of private security providers administer torture in clear violation of national and international human rights laws and the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance guidelines on humane treatment for suspects. The Resolution recommends safeguards by planning adequate schedule for PSC during elections, and set internal channels of communications to enable private security providers contact public security agencies in highly volatile context by way of cooperation.

**Figure 12: Private guards' actions whenever arrest is made**



### 1.2.3 Suspected Perpetrators of Incidences


Most of the election security threats and violence incidences recorded in the 2023 elections were perpetrated by a wide range of stakeholders including political thugs and hoodlums, party members, highly placed politicians, aggrieved voters and party agents.

Figure 13: Suspected perpetrators of election security threats and violence incidences

State of Resident	Suspected perpetrators of the violent incidences
Akwa Ibom	Opponents Supporters, Hoodlums
Anambra	Touts, and INEC officials
Bauchi	Hoodlums, Village head, Hoodlums, Party agents and political thugs, Political opponents, hooligans, Political Thugs and Hoodlums, Party agents and political thugs
Delta	party agents, INEC officials and voters, Political thugs, Voters, Community chiefs, Voters,
Enugu	Party rivals, INEC staff and party agents, Incumbent government, part members, Unknown Gunmen, Voters and INEC staff
FCT	Voters and Party Agents, Hoodlums, Angry voters and hoodlums, and INEC, and voters that want to scatter the polling unit
Kaduna	Political parties, Community members, Thugs and political party members
Kano	Party supporters and thugs
Lagos	Aggrieved voters, political thugs and Hoodlums, Electorate, Political Thugs and Hoodlums
Rivers	Party members and hired political thugs, Party agents and political thugs, Party members and Hoodlums, Government official and party thugs, Women and youths that felt cheated and dissatisfied, with the conduct of the election and the process, angry youth, highly placed politicians and hired political thugs, ruling political party in connivance with INEC, youths dissatisfied with the conduct of the election and the process

Most of the actions taken by private security to deal with highly volatile context are consistent with the Resolution on Private Security Governance guidelines to report to public security agencies by way of cooperation. 62% of private guards reported incidence of threats to public security agencies, investigate (24%) and detain (6%) while 8% barely do anything in such situations.

Figure 14: Private guards' responses to security threats




### 1.3.0. Election Policymaker and Stakeholders Engagement of Private Security Guards and Companies During Elections.

The Electoral Act 2022 in Section 27 (3) stipulates that INEC shall be responsible for requesting for the deployment of relevant security personnel necessary for elections or registrations of voters and shall assign them in a manner determined by the commission in consultation with the relevant security agencies. The law did not set particular boundaries on the relevant security personnel except for the Nigerian Armed Forces, and it did not also explicitly mention private security providers.

Private security providers play significant roles in a nation security architecture and sometimes they provide election-related security services to complement state authorities, or alternatively to stakeholders within the electoral process and the conduct of their activities is usually subjected to national legislation. Election stakeholders' responses to questions on services of PSG reveals of the 193 interviewed, a few (19%) engaged or hire services of PSG during elections. While (<1%) are not really certain about such kind of engagement, most of the interviewed stakeholders (83%) did not engage or hire PSG services during the elections.

Article 1 of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria under the monitoring function requires that in planning security during elections, all stakeholders should consider the key role of private security providers in monitoring and reporting as witnesses of incidents in key electoral venues. This finding reveals that stakeholders did not consider the critical role of private security providers in planning the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria.

Figure 15: Stakeholders responses on engagement of services of PSC



Also, the quantitative data from private security guards on their involvement in election services recently revealed that in the 2023 General elections 18% of PSGC were involved in election services while 82% did not. The quantitative data corroborates the stakeholders interview responses that a limited number of PSGC (<20%) provided services in the 2023 elections.

Figure 16: private guards' involvement in election services



### 1.3.1. Kind of services Private Security Guards and Companies Provide to the Election Stakeholders During Elections

It is important to state that most of the kind of services provided by PSGC listed do not necessarily relate to services rendered during the 2023 elections but stakeholders responded mostly from their experiences with PSGC before, during and after the elections. For instance, most of the stakeholders that said services of PSGC were not engaged or hired during the election also mentioned some kind of services provided by PSGC which is construed broadly to include local community security groups and Vigilante. Services mentioned by stakeholders include: Access and crowd control during NBA interaction and dialogue session with political aspirants.

- Stop and search and crowd control services for political parties especially at political party offices premises, conventions and rallies
- Body guards and bouncer services to protect candidates during conventions in the different political parties
- Escort services, facility and property protection
- gate keeping and guarding of party office premises
- Security guard and watchmen for the protection of public property including motor parks
- Guard ballot boxes and election materials
- guarding and gate keeping of election stakeholders' residential homes
- Guards in Government facilities where polling units are stationed and ensured adequate protections of public property during the election period
- maintaining orderliness to ensure peaceful election process
- Nigeria Vigilante Group who are known to be a community private Security Guards, volunteered to assist public security personnel to control crowd at the polling unit
- Private investigation and intelligent gathering for rapid security response during the Election
- Protection voters from harassment
- Provided service to ensure orderliness and peaceful polling unit

we engaged the services of PSGC for intelligent watch of public property during the election period. PSGC are applauded for their support in the protection of public Property during elections. - NSCDC in Bauchi state

During NBA interface with political Aspirants the private Security Guards were in charge of the control of people within the NBA Secretarial. They ensured safety of the Lawyers and political Aspirants and vehicles during the dialogue session at the NBA Secretarial.- NBA member and election observer in Bauchi state.

The private security Guard ensures safety of the party office and property. They act as" gatekeepers (access control), crowd control during political events within the party office premises. They are not given special payment during elections but whenever aspirant comes around the party office there is always a takeaway (tip)for them at the gate - Political Party Executive and female party agent during the 2023 elections in Bauchi State


As a village head, I had to employ the service of the private Security Guard; because there is a Polling Unit at the border of my palace and no public security was posted at the polling unit, I had to use the Private Guard as gatekeepers and crowd controllers- Traditional leader in Bauchi state.



- Religious centers gate keepers, vehicle control, stop and search services
- Security at party office
- Security services a political party Secretarial
- security, gatekeepers and crowd control at a polling unit where no public security was deployed.
- Vigilante provided volunteer security services to ensure safe and orderly conduct of the elections

The quantitative data from private security guards revealed that 34% did not render any service while others provided perimeter security for campaign venues (33%), provide security to politicians (15%), support operations of public security agencies (15%), and security support to INEC (3%). This data supports the stakeholder information that also identified a broad range of services rendered by PSG in the elections, while some others PSG did not provide any service during the elections. The top five services rendered by PSG in the election process include security to election stakeholders' office premises; security at campaign venues, conventions and rallies; security to politicians and candidates; support to public security service providers, and very limited security to INECs.

*Figure 17: Services private guards' render*



The Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria requires PSG to cooperate with a wide range of stakeholders including public security agencies, exercise their right to work and access to workplace by performing their normal duty even during elections, prevent risk, monitor, gather intelligence information and report incidence.


**Pictures of Private Security Guards at the Front Gate of the National Headquarters of the People Democratic Party and Labour Party at FCT:**



### 1.3.2 Level and Quality of Service or Performance of the Private Security Guards and Companies.


Stakeholders were asked to rate the level or quality of services as well as performance of PSGC in their own words. Most of the stakeholders responded that they cannot rate the level and quality of services or performance by PSGC because private security is not involved in the 2023 election process. Less than half of stakeholders interviewed described quality of PSGC services in different positive ways ranging from good, excellent, professional and satisfactory among others. The Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria requires PSGC to be professional and adhere to national and international regulations and good practices. See Figure 18.

Figure 18: Election stakeholders rating of PSG quality of service and performance



Also, PSG described their experiences at work broadly as good (68%), bad (7%) and can't tell (26%) which agrees with the qualitative data that a good number of stakeholders cannot rate the services or performance of PSG because they are not involved in the election directly. Also, the wide range of positive and negative words used in describing performance of PSG raises concerns about Private security providers compliance with the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance in Nigeria requirement for professional and adherence to national and international regulations and good practices. See figure 19.

Figure 19: Private guards experiences at work



**1.3.3. Election Policymaker and Stakeholders Experienced of Act of Misconducts by Private Security Guards and Companies, and the Kind of Misconducts.**

Most election stakeholders interviewed stated that they have not experienced misconduct by PSG largely because PSG are not involved in election directly. However, a few others who are mostly voters, CSOs, and candidates have experienced or witnessed some acts of misconducts by PSG. Generally, about 96 percent of election stakeholders interviewed have no experience of misconduct by PSG but less than four percent have some experience. Two of the 193 stakeholders interviewed did not respond to the question. Some of the kinds of misconducts experienced by stakeholders are shown in 20 below.


*Figure 20: Stakeholders experience of PSG misconduct*



**1.4.0 Awareness of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance in Nigeria**

While only a few election stakeholders have experience acts of misconduct by private security providers, 67% of private security provider respondents are not aware of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance in Nigeria requirement for professional and adherence to national and international regulations and good practices.


*Figure 21: Private guards' awareness of the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance During Election*





Also, among the 33% that are aware of the resolutions only 30% have a copy of the Resolution. Apparently, the seeming widespread ignorance and lack of access to information about the Resolution is a red flag for PSGC professional misconduct.

**Figure 22: Availability of the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance During Election to Private Guards**



## SECTION 2: PSCs COMPLIANCE TO AVAILABLE REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION

### 2.1.1. Kind of Training and Preparations Private Security Guards and Companies Received During Election


Most stakeholders interviewed (86.5%) could not tell if PSG received any form of training and preparations during the elections. A few stakeholders estimated (13.5) said PSG did received training during the elections in the following areas;

- cooperation with the public security agencies, monitoring, use of force, incident reporting
- monitoring, safety and health at work


Stakeholders stated that the trainings for PSG were mostly in-house, one private security stakeholder said they received training from the Nigeria Police and DSS, as well as from ex-service men. Another stakeholder mentioned that they were trained by the African Law Foundation (AFRILAW). It is significant to mention that the absence of targeted training and preparedness by PSG during elections is a RedFlag that could potentially undermine stakeholders support for their official involvement during elections. The Resolution requires that private security companies in coordination with the government, civil society and the media will ensure that the personnel receive targeted training for the election context according to national laws and international norms. The limited number of trainings is an indication of weak coordination among private security companies, the government, civil society and the media in the context of the 2023 elections.

In addition, the quantitative data obtained from PSG revealed that 68% have not received training on the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 Election while only 32% did.

**Figure 23: Private guards trained on the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance During Election**




**Figure 24: Private guards trained from the 10 CMAP states**




The PSG trained were mostly in Lagos and the FCT, and Bauchi states. Kano and Kaduna recorded no such trainings. The trainings on sexual and gender-based violence was also limited to 34% of private security providers while 66% did not receive such trainings. The three northern states of Bauchi, Kano and Kaduna had no SGB trainings, and Akwa-Ibom in the South has less than 5% trained on SGBV, The Resolution requires that private security providers will be provided with adequate safeguards against sexual exploitation and abused based on their specific needs. The limited and near absence trainings for personnel on SGBV implies a is a weak compliance with the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse for private security personnel by the Resolution

**Figure 25: Private guards trained on SGBV**




The FCT has the highest number of private guards trained (100%) while Akwa-Ibom stated recorded the least number of trainings. See figure 26.

**Figure 26: Private guards trained on Gender Based Violence from the 10 CMAP states**



In terms of preparedness 74% of PSC did not provide safety tools and equipment for the election nor for incidence reporting.

**Figure 27: Private guards provided with safety tools and incidence reporting for election**




Also, 71% of personnel did not receive risk and safety assessment since the build up to the election in violation of the Resolutions guidelines on safety and health at work for personnel. That only 23% received targeted training concerning the 2023 election is a rather weak compliance with the Resolution guidelines on training by private guard companies. See figure 28 below.

**Figure 28: Private guards that received targeted trainings for the 2023 election**




Every 7 out of 10 private security personnel interviewed have a means of communicating with public security agencies in case of emergency in compliance with the Resolutions guidelines for cooperation with the public security agencies, and incidence reporting and remedies.

**Figure 29: Private guards having a means of communicating with public security**



In states like Akwa-Ibom and the FCT every private guard have a means of communicating with public security agencies but in Kaduna state just 8% of PSC have such channels of communication with public security agencies.

**Figure 30: Private guards having a means of communication with public security from the 10 CMAP states**



As a good practice PSC are required to undertake a risk and safety assessment of personnel with a view to providing adequate safeguards especially during elections. Data from the field indicates that 71% of private guards did not receive any form of risk and safety assessment preparatory to the 2023 elections.

**Figure 31: Private guards risk and safety assessment preparatory to the 2023 election**



**2.1.2. Payment of Allowance for Services Provided by Private Security Guards and Companies during Elections**

Most election stakeholders interviewed (75%) are either not aware or they do not pay for services rendered by private security guards and companies during elections with just a few (25%) that said services provided by private security during elections are provided for. The pattern of stakeholder responses raises concern about the current level of PSG engagement and participation in elections. See figure 22 below.

**Figure 32: Payment for services provided by PSG during elections**




Most of the positive responses to payment and compensation for PSG were provided by stakeholders that engage services of PSC that pays them monthly such as political parties for services renders in party offices premises, and NURTW for services rendered at motor parks, religious leaders for access control and stop and search services rendered in churches and mosques. Leaders of political parties also engage PSC in their homes to provide gatekeeper and body guards services. These are routine pre, during, and post-election services that stakeholders may not consider specifically as election focused. The election-related payment mentioned by stakeholders was in Bauchi state. First a Village head in Bauchi who engaged PSC to provide security services including crowd control at a polling unit close to his Palace that had no public security presence. Also, a private detective organization providing intelligent information for rapid security response during the elections received


some form of payment from the Special Assistant (SA) Security in Bauchi state. PSC operated by politicians also received payment during the elections.

Private security guards also acknowledged that only 14% PSG received additional monetary incentives and allowance for election related duties while 86% did not receive any additional payment for election duties. Most of the additional allowances received for election duties ranges from five to nine thousand naira, and twenty to twenty-four thousand naira maximum estimated to be between (USD 10 – 48).

**Figure 33: Additional incentives and allowance for election duties**




**Figure 34: Amount in of money incentives and allowance paid to private security during for elections**



However, 86% PSG do not think that the election work exposes them to heightened risk but 14% do. Where there is a feeling of potential risk as a result election duties the Resolution guidelines requires that adequate compensational measure should be provided.

**Figure 35: Feeling of exposure to risk due to election work**




Private security guards interviewed listed several risks they face to include:

- ATM Users Abuse me when the machine fails to dispense cash
- Attack by thugs
- Attack in the Polling Unit
- Attacks by street boys
- Danger of Attack
- Death
- Fight
- Kidnapping
- Political thuggery and attacks
- Riots
- Risk of outbreak of Fighting and violence
- Threat to Life
- Using force on you by election candidates

**2.1.3 Cooperation Between Private Security Guards and Companies and Public Security Agencies During Elections**


Every public security election stakeholder interviewed in the CMAP claims that private security guards are not involved in the election process. Other stakeholders describe the level of cooperation between public and private security from the broader definition of PSGC to include vigilante, community security group and any form of security services that is not government owned irrespective of legal status and organization structure. Stakeholders describe the level of cooperation between public security and PSGC in their own words as follows; cannot tell, good, cordial, mutual, peaceful, guided by law, poor etc.

**Figure 36: Cooperation between private guards and public security.**





**Opinion from a Stakeholder:**




**I think the cooperation between public and PSGC is poor because the public security agencies are yet to accept the private security companies as actors in the security architecture of the country.**

**- Female NSCDC personnel providing security and monitoring of election collation in Rivers State**

**2.1.4 Stakeholders Support of Official Engagement and Participation of Private Security Guards and Companies During Elections in Nigeria?**

A little more than half of stakeholders interviewed (55%) supported official engagement and participation of PSGC during elections to complement the efforts of the public security agencies and improve election security in Nigeria. A little below half of interviewed stakeholders (43%) are totally opposed to official engagement of private security in elections due to perceived risk of partisanship that might potentially compromise credibility of the polls while 2% are indifferent.

*Figure 37: Stakeholders support for official engagement of PSC in election*



**Categories of Stakeholder and Their Level of Support:**

- ❖ **ABSOLUTE SUPPORT** - APSGC, KANSIEC, NBA, NURTW, Private Detective organizations (BSPDO), Religious leader.
- ❖ **PARTLY SUPPORT** - Candidate, CSO, INEC Staff, Media, NSCDC, Observer, Party Member, Public security, Voter.
- ❖ **TOTAL REJECTION OF ENGAGEMENT OF PSGC IN ELECTIONS** - DSS, Election Monitor, Immigration Officer, Medical Personnel, Police, Security, Veteran.

## Some Stakeholders Opinions and Comments:

1. I have the opinion that private security are owned by private individuals that have various political affiliations and as such they are bound to be partisan – DSS election stakeholder
2. I think the Election Policymaker and Stakeholders support official engagement and participation of the private security guards and companies during elections to complement the efforts of the public security agencies and improve election security in Nigeria. This is necessary because, the number of public security agencies sent to a polling unit is not enough and most times they are overwhelmed by the crowd – NSCDC election stakeholder

As media practitioners we observed that private Security Guards services are been employed by various political parties as gatekeepers, and to ensure effective access and crowd control mostly within the office premises and in political rallies. We have not seen PSGC involve in elections directly but we observed an incidence during political rally at Duguri Village, Alkaleri LGA of Bauchi State; were the Nigeria Vigilante Group of Duguri Branch were used to attacked a rival political party with dane guns. While there is always a feeling of cordial cooperation between the Public Security and the Private Security Guard, in the contrary- two days after the Presidential election at Alkaleri LGA of Bauchi state, police exchanged fired with Nigeria Vigilante Groups alleged to have been paid by politicians to attack opposition parties with dane gun. - Media Practitioner and Election Observer/Reporter in Bauchi state.

- ❖ The Bauchi State Private Detective Organisation was engaged to provide private investigation and intelligent information for rapid security response during the Election. They received preparatory training on intelligent information gathering and reporting from the Nigerian Police and DSS. They receive a token of allowance from the SA Security during the elections - Private Detective Organisation.
- ❖ The Church and Mosque engage PSGC to provide stop and search, vehicle control, and gatekeeper services. -Religious Leader in Bauch State.
- ❖ I also engage PSGC in my home to provide body guard and gatekeeper services - Woman Leader of Political Party in Bauchi state.
- ❖ PSGC should not participate in election because they will be partisan, and work for the highest bidder - Voter in Anambra State.
- ❖ PSGC will contribute a lot towards promoting peace before, during and after elections - TMG observer in Kano state.
- ❖ I support PSGC official engagement and participation in election because if you look at the polling units you will observer that there are very small number of security agents and they cannot even control the crowd adequately, if PSGC is engaged they will help in controlling the situation. - Female Voter in Kano state.

## **SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF THE KEY OBSERVATION AND FINDINGS**

### **3.1.1 Summary of the Key Observations and Findings**

- Both the quantitative data from private security guards and qualitative data from election stakeholders revealed that only a limited number of PSC provided services in the 2023 elections. This finding further reveals that stakeholders did not consider the critical role of private security providers in planning the 2023 General Elections in Nigeria. This finding implies that election stakeholders did not comply with Article 1 of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria guidelines which requires that in planning security during elections, all stakeholders should consider the key role of private security providers in monitoring and reporting as witnesses of incidents in key electoral venues.
- The top five services rendered by PSG in the election process include security to election stakeholders' office premises including political parties; security at campaign venues, conventions, and rallies; security to politicians and election candidates; support to public security service providers, and extremely limited security to INECs. The Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria requires PSC to cooperate with a wide range of stakeholders including public security agencies, exercise their right to work and access to workplace by performing their normal duty even during elections, prevent risk, monitor, gather intelligence information and report incidence.
- It was found that both positive and negative words such as good, bad and cannot tell, were used to describe the quality of services and performance by private security providers, Probably because a limited number of PSC are involved or most PSG are not involved during the 2023 elections a good number of stakeholders cannot rate the services or performance of PSG. The wide range of positive and negative words used in describing performance of PSGC raises concerns about Private security providers compliance with the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance in Nigeria requirement for professional and adherence to national and international regulations and good practices.
- Most election stakeholders have not experienced misconduct by PSG largely because PSC are not involved in election directly. However, a few others who are mostly voters, CSOs, and candidates have experienced some acts of misconduct by PSG such as extortion, harassment and intimidation, verbal abuse, and gender-based violence (GBV). This is further corroborated by the seeming ignorance about the Resolution among PSC which is a potential red flag for PSG professional misconduct. It was found that nearly two-third of private security provider respondents are not aware of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance in Nigeria requirement for professional and adherence to national and international regulations and good practices. Also, among the estimated one-third that are aware of the Resolutions only 30% have a copy of it.
- The absence or limited number of targeted training and preparedness by PSC during elections is a red flag that could potentially undermine stakeholders' support for their official involvement during elections. In addition, it was found that 68% did not receive training on the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 election while only 32% did. PSC trained were mostly in Lagos and the FCT, and Bauchi states. Kano and Kaduna recorded no such training. The Resolution requires that private security companies in coordination with the government, civil society and the media ensure that the personnel receive targeted training for the election context according to national laws and international norms. The limited number of trainings is an indication of weak coordination among private security companies, the government, civil society, and the media in the context of the 2023 elections.
- The three northern states of Bauchi, Kano and Kaduna had no SGBV trainings, and Akwa-Ibom in the South had less than 5% trained on SGBV, The Resolution requires that private security providers be provided with adequate safeguards against sexual exploitation and abused

based on their specific needs. The limited and near absence training for personnel on SGBV implies a weak compliance with the Resolution for Private Security Governance during the 2023 Elections prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse for private security personnel.

- Stakeholders identified a wide range of roles and functions performed during the 2023 General elections to include security, voting, monitoring, and observing among others based on their functions but failed to mention their roles before and after the elections. It is important to state that a seeming lack of clarity pervades the election stakeholder community on the concept of private security, often PSGC is construed as any form of broadly defined security that is not part of the regular government security forces such as Vigilante groups, private bodyguards, and bouncers, as well as local community security group with no formal structure. It is important to state that the Resolution for Private Security Governance during the 2023 Elections is company specific.
- Non-uploading of election results via the BVAS at the polling units is considered a clear violation of INEC electoral guidelines, a structural violence and security threat during elections. Although stakeholders identified highly placed politicians and hired political thugs mostly as the suspected perpetrators, it is important to state that INEC including the leadership and field officials at the polling units during elections are lawfully empowered to transmit election results.
- A few stakeholders especially party members who had formerly held elective positions consider their role in the election process as “support to their party” – the context in which the word “support” is used seems problematic, it is not easy to decipher between lawful and unlawful support to their party in the election process. Interestingly some of them are also quick to say that they do not experience much violence and security incidence during the election process”. This seeming defense tactics in answering the question of violence is a potential red flag on how highly placed politicians support their political party to undermine security risk and violence during elections.
- Conflict of Interest: Some candidates contesting for positions in the elections actually registered their own PSC to provide Gatekeepers, Body Guards and escort services for them. This is certain a potential conflict of interest and a partisan harbinger if such PSC are hired for the conduct of elections that corroborates election stakeholders fears that private security is owned by private individuals that have various political affiliations and are a potential source of partisanship and election security risk. This fear was expressly mostly by public security. The Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria guidelines requires PSC to adhere to highest professional standards and good practices in national laws and international norms.
- Private security providers also experienced security threat and violence during the elections in form of gender-based violence - harassment and insult because of their gender but there was no need for arrest in most cases as PSC report to public security agencies. However, very few private security providers administer torture in clear violation of national and international human rights laws and the Resolution for Good Private Security Governance guidelines on humane treatment for suspects. The Resolution recommends safeguards by planning adequate schedule for PSC during elections, and set internal channels of communications to enable private security providers contact public security agencies in highly volatile context by way of cooperation. Most of the actions taken by most private security to deal with highly volatile context is consistent with the Resolution on Private Security Governance guidelines to report to public security agencies by way of cooperation.
- Most PSC did not provide safety tools and equipment for the election nor for incidence reporting and personnel did not receive risk and safety assessment since the buildup to the election in violation of the Resolutions guidelines on safety and health at work for personnel. Also, very few PSC received target training concerning the 2023 Election, a rather weak compliance with the Resolution guidelines on training.
- Every 7 out of 10 private security personnel have a means of communicating with public security agencies in case of emergency in compliance with the Resolutions guidelines for cooperation with the public security agencies, and incidence reporting and remedies

- Private security guards also acknowledged that only very few of them received additional monetary incentives and allowance for election related duties. Most of the additional allowances received for election duties ranges from five to nine thousand Naira, and twenty to twenty-four thousand Naira maximum estimated to be between ten to forty-eight USD. Significantly, most PSG do not think that the election work exposes them to heightened risk. Where there is a feeling of potential risk as a result election duties the Resolution guidelines requires that adequate compensational measure should be provided
- One private detective organization in Bauchi state engaged in private investigation and sharing of intelligence information for rapid security response during the election, this good practice is consistent with the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria guidelines for private security during elections, incidence reporting, and cooperation with public security

### 3.1.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

#### A: Private Security and Election Policymakers

- The critical and complementary roles and functions of the private security providers in improving election security in Nigeria need to be recognized and supported by all election policymakers and stakeholders and the public particularly INEC and government security agencies. Private security companies should be officially integrated as part of election security architecture of the federal government. Private security industry has the largest security manpower and if appropriately harnessed by the federal government can greatly contribute in ensuring election security in Nigeria. The Independent Electoral Commission should initiate cooperation between Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) and the PSC to maximize the critical role of private security providers during elections. PSGC reported rendering limited services to INEC compared to other election stakeholders in the 2023 general elections.
- The Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria adopted by stakeholders during the National Stakeholders Forum on Private Security and 2023 Elections in Nigeria held on Wednesday February 15, 2023 at Abuja should be used as a template for strengthening and advancing of private security governance and reform in the electoral process in Nigeria. Also, an increased cooperation between INEC, PSC and other election stakeholders will strengthen implementation of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria requirements for election stakeholders cooperation with PSC as well guarantee private security service providers right to work and access to workplace by performing their normal duty to prevent risk, monitor, gather intelligence information and report incidence during future elections.
- Deliberate efforts should be made by all critical election policy makers and stakeholders to comply with the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During 2023 Elections in Nigeria to ensure that the critical role of private security providers in monitoring and reporting incidences, proving security for election stakeholders office premises, politicians and election candidates, political parties events, INEC, and support services to public security agencies is considered in planning future elections in Nigeria. A legislative framework, muti-stakeholders dialogues, and awareness creation could serve as potential entry point to actualize mandatory or voluntary compliance.
- Capacity building of private security providers around the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 elections in Nigeria should be encouraged to enhance the quality of their services and professional performance and adherence to national and international norms and good practices. Training programmes and distribution of copies of the Resolution would be a veritable tool to address the current capacity gap.
- Addressing structural violence: attempts to deescalate tension and minimize security threats in the electoral process should also consider structural violence and root causes of election related violence such as, delayed arrival of electoral materials and non-uploading of election results via the Bimodal

Voters Accreditation System and other lawful medium to demonstrate transparency and fairness, and voters' confidence in the electoral process.

- Neutrality of PSC: Mechanisms to ensure neutrality and non-partisanship by PSC and their owners should be put in place to ensure that PSGC and by extension private security services providers are not unduly influenced by their owners and politicians to favour certain political affiliations and politics during elections. Such mechanism should also address potential conflict of interest through comprehensive due diligence and background check of PSC ownership, and candidates contesting for various positions in the different political parties.

#### **B: Private Security Companies**

- Private security companies should increase coordination with relevant election stakeholders including the government, civil society and the media to ensure that the personnel receive targeted training and preparation for the election context according to national laws and international norms in compliance with the Resolution for Private Security Governance in Election in Nigeria. The absence or limited number of targeted training and preparedness by PSC during the 2023 elections is a red flag that could potentially undermine stakeholders' support for their official involvement during future elections. It is important that targeted trainings in the context of elections should be widespread and not focused on personnel in Lagos and Abuja only. Trainings for personnel should also include SGBV with deliberate efforts to train personnel across all geopolitical zones, especially the north. Other forms of target trainings should include human rights, torture and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment.
- Adequate compensation measures and allowance should be provided for private security guard involved in election particularly high risk and volatile areas. Only very few private securities received additional monetary incentive for election related duties that was usually between ten to forty-eight USD equivalent in Naira. Where there is a feeling of potential risk because of election duties, the resolution on Private Security guideline provides that adequate compensational measures should be put in place.
- Capacity building of private security providers around the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance during the 2023 elections in Nigeria should be encouraged to enhance the quality of their services and professional performance and adherence to national and international norms and good practices. Training programmes and distribution of copies of the Resolution would be a veritable tool to address the current capacity gap.



# APPENDIX I

## Resolution for Good Private Security Governance

### RESOLUTIONS FOR GOOD PRIVATE SECURITY GOVERNANCE DURING 2023 ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA



These resolutions draw from the Nigerian Private Guard Companies Act of 1986 and Private Guard Companies Regulation of 2018, the good practices of the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. (The Code).



#### BEFORE THE ELECTIONS

##### 1 PLANNING



###### Cooperation with the Public Security Agencies

Establish internal mechanisms to ensure cooperation between public and private security.  
Set external channels so that private security can contact the public security agencies during the highly volatile context of elections.



###### Cooperation with the media

Media will develop a tool and training for private security providers on effective monitoring.



###### Monitoring

In planning security during elections, all stakeholders should consider the key role of private security providers in monitoring and reporting incidents, namely as witnesses of incidents in key electoral venues.



###### Right to Work and Access to Workplace

Private Security should be allowed to continue the normal duty they perform even during elections including monitoring their beats and access to work places.



###### Liability planning

Private security providers should ensure that appropriate insurance and financial reserves cover potential liabilities, as the personnel should not have to bear the cost of potential harm due to the volatile context.



###### Contingency and risk management Plan

For high risks areas should be updated. Private security should also contribute to efficient emergency response in case of an accident in election venues.



###### Right to vote of private security personnel

should be safeguarded by planning adequate schedules during the elections period.

##### 2 TRAINING

Private security companies, in coordination with the government, civil society, and media will ensure that the personnel receives targeted training for the election context according to national law and international norms.

##### 3 SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK

Private security providers will provide for adapted equipment for the personnel to ensure their safety (e.g. introducing a helmet in the uniform if they are located in high-risk areas during the elections period). Private security providers will conduct health and safety assessments of the different postings and take appropriate preventative measures before the elections.

#### DURING THE ELECTIONS

##### 4 PREVENTION OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

Private security personnel will be provided with sufficient safeguards against sexual exploitation and abuse, according to their specific needs.

Private security personnel will notify authorities immediately in case of risk or occurrence of gender-based violence or abuse to themselves or third parties during the elections.

##### 5 USE OF FORCE

Use of Force by private security providers will be strictly confined to the principle of self-defense.

In such cases, private security personnel will apply the principles of necessity, proportionality, and precaution.

Private security personnel will actively de-escalate violence in instances where they are required to complement the efforts of public security regarding crowd control, namely avoiding illegitimate use of force.

##### 6 DETENTION OF PERSONS

Detention and apprehension by private security personnel will be strictly to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence or following an attack committed against them or property under their protection. The person held must be treated humanely and consistent with national and international law.

The private security personnel must hand over the person to the public security agency. The private security personnel should record the circumstances of this incident and notify the superiors.

#### AFTER THE ELECTIONS

##### 7 INCIDENT REPORTING AND REMEDIES

Private security providers will contribute to effective grievance mechanisms, including prosecution and investigation of any incident during the elections, by sharing relevant on-the-ground information with the public security agency.

## Appendix II

### Names of Private security companies Interviewed

STATE	PRIVATE SECURITY COMAPNY	NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
Akwa Ibom	BULLSHARKS	7
	DIAMOND SECURITY	15
	Diamond Security Guard	15
	FORT KNOX GAURDS	15
	Halogen Security	4
	HALOGENS SECURITY SERVICES	7
	KINGS GUARD	15
	MAINSTREET GUARD	15
	TOWER OF IVORY SECURITY, EDIENE ABAK	7
Anambra	Alfa Transglobe Ltd	16
	Darforp Security	16
	Grayling Security Service	13
	King's Squad Ltd	16
	Omabala Guards	29
	Philly Smith Security	10
Bauchi	Alhasar Security Services	6
	Bauchi Peace Security	6
	Baushe Hunter Security & Patro	6
	Bully Guard Nigeria Ltd	6
	Crown Constituency Ltd	6
	Danga security & Patrol	6
	Danga Security Patrol	6
	Executive Guard Ltd	6
	Garu Security Hunters Ltd	6
	KIngs Guard Nig Ltd	6
	Kombat Security Ltd	6
	Nigeria Vigilante Group	6
	Rotal Guard Security Ltd	6
	Spider Webs security Limit	6
	Watch Dog PDO Ltd	6
	Zabgai security Limited	6
Delta	BL GROUP	7
	BL GROUP NIG LTD	3
	BLGroup Nigeria Ltd	3
	CITISERVE	3
	Citiserve Security Ltd	10
	DYNAMIC CHERISH co ltd	10
	DYNAMIC CHERISH SECURITY COMPANY	37
	N24 Security services ltd	27



Enugu	AMOBEN SECURITY SERVICES LTD	4
	BESTEYE SECURITY SERVICES	4
	Halogen Security	21
	KINGS GUARDS NIG. LTD	4
	LONGUS SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED	4
	PIMSKYNET SECURITY SERVICES	4
	PR24 SECURITY	4
	PR24 SECURITY SERVICES	17
	SANTANA SECURITY SERVICES	8
	SONAFEM AGENCIES LTD	4
	ST CHRISTOPHER SECURITY SERVICES	8
	UCHECHUKWU SECURITY GUARDS	4
	VIP SECURITY SERVICES	13
Rivers		18
	Abokus Integrated Security	4
	Abord Security Services	4
	Arco Marine	4
	Aston Marine and Offshore Nig.	4
	Bdigree Security Consult	4
	Bemil Nigeria Ltd	4
	Broadbase Security	4
	Bulwark Services Ltd	4
	Danger guard Security Services	4
	E&A Security Services	4
	Fairway Offshore Security Ltd	4
	Gelose Marine	4
	Jeofel Security Company	4
	Keves Global Ltd	4
	Kings Unique Security	4
	Larrydel Global Security	4
	Macville Security Company Ltd	4
	Strikeview Security Ltd	4
	Technocrime Security Ltd	4
	Threat Security and Safety Ltd	4
	Votex Security Concept	4
	Watchdog Security Ltd	4
Xceed Security Service ltd	4	
FCT	Aims Security	7
	Blue Pacific Int. Ltd	3
	BMO Security and Guards Ltd	10
	Castle and Tower Guards	3
	Composite Private Security Company	3
	Corporate Guards	3
	Crown Continental Ltd	3
	Diplomatic Security Service	3
	Eagle Patrol and Sentinel Services Ltd.	3
	Festamos Security	3

	GVRAA Security	3
	Halogen Security Company	3
	Hogan Guards Services	3
	Infinity Security	3
	Kings Guard Ltd	3
	Maxq Security	3
	MGSS Security	3
	My project Security	3
	Nigeria Elites Security Organization (NESO)	3
	Rapid Security Guard	3
	Real Strikers Security Services	3
	Rozmmanton Security Services	3
	Sears Security Ltd	3
	Spectra Guards	3
	Stetsonet Security Nigeria Ltd	3
	Thunder Bolt Security	3
	Tomsalem Security Services	3
Kaduna	Alpha Metro Guards	4
	Asco Security Ltd	7
	Black Security	4
	Citizens Security Ltd	4
	Combat Security Ltd	4
	Daroza Security Ltd	4
	Diamond Security	7
	Eagle eyes Security	4
	Eagle eyes Security	4
	Geftal Security Ltd	4
	Harvard Security Ltd	4
	Kings Security	7
	Kings Security	4
	Marshal Security Ltd	7
	Niger Guard Ltd	4
	Quicke Response Security	4
	Silver Guards Ltd	7
	Silver Security Ltd	4
	Tiddo Security	4
	Ultimate Shield Security	4
	Ultimate Shield Security	4
	Unity Security	4
	Vigilamp Security Ltd	4
Kano	Analytical Security Guard	5
	Ayara Guards	5
	Black Condor Security	10
	Bye Security Guard	5
	Gridlock Security	5
	Halogen Security	5
	Hydra Guard Nigeria	5

	Hydra Security	5
	King David	5
	King Guard	5
	M.U Guard	5
	M.U Security Ltd	5
	Mikiya Security	5
	Original Security	5
	Pama Global Security	5
	Prihamao Guards	5
	Prihoma Investment Ltd	5
	Prudential Guards Ltd	5
	Samjobel Security	5
Lagos	Arslan Security Serv	4
	Astra Security Servi	4
	Dbreeze Protection S	4
	De Falcon Security S	4
	Denane Security Post	4
	Frontier Risk Security	4
	Gestod Services Nige	4
	Golbek Resources Ltd	4
	Indepth Watchers Sec	4
	Kk Security Ltd	4
	Magnum Security Ltd	4
	Novus Guards Ltd	4
	Octopus Security Ltd	4
	Perfect Zecure Nig.	4
	Seagull Security Serv	4
	Shegatol Security Se	4
	Sheperd Guards. Ltd	4
	Sheperd Guards. Ltd.	4
	Sheriff Deputies Ltd	7
	Shield Services Nige	4
	Strength Security Ltd	7
	Sure40 Protections	4
	Symans Security Ltd	4
	Turret Security Serv	4
	Young Africana. Ltd	4
	Young Africana. Ltd.	4

# Appendix III

## Stakeholders Interview Guide

<b>THE STAKEHOLDERS/POLICYMAKERS INTERVIEW GUIDE</b>
------------------------------------------------------

**KEY ELECTION POLICYMAKERS & STAKEHOLDERS:** INEC/SIEC and Staff/Workers; Political Parties and Members; Election Candidates/Aspirants; NSCDC and Public Security Agencies and CSOs/Media/Election Voters/Monitors/Observers

1. **Gender of the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders?**
2. **Who is the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders?**
3. **Where is Election Policymaker/Stakeholders State of Resident?**
4. **What is the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders roles/functions during elections?**
5. **What kind of election security threats and violence have the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders experienced or witnessed during the 2023 election in the state?**
6. **Who are those suspected to be perpetrators of these violent incidences?**
7. **Do the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders engage or hire the service of private security guards and companies during elections?**
8. **What kind of services do private security guards and companies provide to the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders during elections?**
9. **What is the level/quality of service or performance of the private security guards and companies?**
10. **Have the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders experienced or witnessed any act of misconducts by private security guards and companies, and what kind of misconducts? (e.g., Intimidation, Harassment, Use of excessive force, Verbal Abuses, Assaults occasioning grievous bodily harm, Extortion, Stealing/Connivance, Unlawful Arrest/Detention, Torture, Inhuman & degrading treatment and Gender-based Violence/discrimination).**
11. **What kind of training or preparations did the private security guards and companies received during the election (e.g. Cooperation with the Public Security Agencies; Monitoring; Contingency and Risk Management Plan; Cooperation with Media; Liability Planning; Right to Vote of Private Security personnel, Safety and Health at Work, Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Use of Force, Detention of Persons and Incident Reporting and Remedies), and who provided the training or made the preparations?**
12. **Is there any provision/ payment of allowance by the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders for services provided by the private security guards and companies during the elections?**
13. **What is the level of cooperation between the private security guards and companies and public security agencies during elections**
14. **Do the Election Policymaker/Stakeholders support official engagement and participation of the private security guards and companies during elections to complement the efforts of the public security agencies and improve election security in Nigeria?**

# Appendix IV

## Private Security Guard Questionnaire

<b>QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS DURING 2023 ELECTIONS</b>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

### SECTION A: Socio-demographic

1. Gender of the Respondent	Female	1
	Male	2
2. State of Operation	Akwa Ibom	1
	Anambra	2
	Bauchi	3
	Delta	4
	Enugu	5
	Kaduna	6
	Kano	7
	Lagos	8
	Rivers	9
	F.C.T	10
3. Name of Private Security Company		

### SECTION B: Private Security Service and the 2023 General Elections

4. Have you been involved in election services recently?	No	1
	Yes	2
5. If yes to Q4, what service did you render?	Provided perimeter security for campaign venue	1
	Provided security to political figure	2
	Supported the operations of the formal security agencies	3
	Provided security support to INEC	4
6. Are you aware of the Resolutions for Good Private Security Governance During Election?	No	1
	Yes	2
7. If yes to Q6, do you have a copy of the resolution?	No	1
	Yes	2
8. Have you been trained on the Good Resolution for Good Private Security Governance During the 2023 Election?	No	1
	Yes	2
9. What is the nature of the event or service?	Political Rally/Campaign	1
	Man Guarding/Escort Event	2
	Gate Keeping	3
	Car Parking/Traffic Control	4
10. How would you describe your experience working on the assignment?	Very Bad	1
	Bad	2
	Can't Tell	3
	Good	4
	Very Good	5
11. Were you harassed or insulted because of your gender while on duty?	No	1
	Yes	2

12. If yes to Q11, kindly state by who	N/A	
13. While discharging your duty, was there any need to arrest/detain anyone	No	1
	Yes	2
14. If yes to Q13, what was your next action?	Allowed the person to go	1
	Torture the person	2
	Reported to the organizers	
	Handed the person over to security agencies present	3
15. What security threats have you noticed around you?	Kidnapping	1
	Political Thuggery & Attacks	2
	Riots /Demonstrations	3
	Cultism	4
	Fighting	5
	Killing	6
16. What has been your response to the security threats around your area?	Arson & Destruction of properties	7
	Did nothing	1
	Investigated and detained	2
	Investigated and reported to the public security agencies	3
17. Who are those suspected to be perpetrators of these violent incidences?	Reported the threat to public security agencies	4
18. Have you been trained on Sexual and Gender Based Violence?	No	1
	Yes	2

**SECTION B: PSCs Compliance to available Regulations for the Election**

19. Please pick as appropriate the number of trainings provided to you by your company for the election.	Safety	1
	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse	2
	Use of Force	3
	Detention of Persons	4
	Incident Reporting	5
20. Did your company provide you with safety tool or equipment for the election?	No	1
	Yes	2
21. Did you receive targeted training concerning the 2023 election?	No	1
	Yes	2
22. Do you have a means of communicating with public security agencies in case of any emergency?	No	1
	Yes	2
23. Has there been risk and safety assessment on you since the build-up to the election?	No	1
	Yes	2
24. Were you provided additional monetary incentive or allowance for your election related duty?	No	1
	Yes	2
25. If yes to Q24, how much?	5000-9000	1
	10000 - 14000	2
	15000 - 19000	3
	20000 - 24000	4
26. Do you think your election work exposes you risk or danger?	No	1
	Yes	2
27. If yes to Q26, what form of risk are you exposed to?		

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